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THE DOCTRINE OF Lis PENDENS
THE DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS IN LEGAL ACTIONS AF-
FECTING LAND
From conversations which the writer has had with various members of
the Bar, including title attorneys, there seems to be a general belief that
purchasers of land from a party to a pending suit affecting it, are not charg-
ed with constructive knowledge of such suit unless a notice of its pendency
is filed in the office of the Recorder of Deeds, as provided by Section 3155,
R. S. Mo. 1929. This, however, is not the case except as to the limited
character of actions mentioned in this section. As will be pointed out, there
are many types of real actions not of that character, in which pendente lite
purchasers are bound by the decree rendered in the case, although no notice
of its pendency was filed in the Recorder's office. A brief examination of
this section and of its construction will demonstrate this.
By the provisions of Section 3155, the plaintiff, in a civil action affecting
real estate "based on any equitable right, claim or lien" may file a notice of
the pendency of the suit in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of the county
where the land is situated. When so filed, subsequent purchasers and en-
cumbrancers are charged with constructive knowledge of the pendency of
the suit.
This section first appeared in the Missouri Statutes in the Revision of
1865 (R. S. 1865 Ch. 1-97, p. 77). As indicated, it applies only to suits of
an equitable nature. There is no statute which authorizes a similar notice
to be filed where the action affecting real estate is based on a legal right,
claim or lien.
However, the doctrine of lis pendens is not confined to proceedings in
equity, and it does not date from the enactment of this statute. It is of
ancient origin. The doctrine was formulated and promulgated by Sir Fran-
cis Bacon in 1618, as the twelfth of his Ordinances in Chancery. (*1)
Even before that date, the principle was recognized by the courts. (*2)
(1) 4 Bacon's Works, p. 515. The Ordinance is as follows: "No decree bindeth
anyone that cometh in bona fide by conveyance from the defendant before the bill ex-
hibited; and is made no party either by bill or by order. But where he comes in pen-
dente lite, and while the suit is in full prosecution and without any color of allowance
or privity of the Court, there regularly the decree bindeth, but if there were any in-
termission of suit or the Court were made acquainted with the conveyance, the Court
is to give order upon the special matter according to justice."
(2) O'Reilly v. Nicholson, 45 Mo. 160, McIlwrath v. Hollander, 73 Mo. 105,
Bristow v. Thackston, 187 Mo. 332, Burnham v. Smith, 82 Mo. App. 35. For a full
discussion of the origin of the doctrine and of the early English cases recognizing it,
see the case of Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 577. The purpose of the rule
is "to preserve the situation as it existed when the litigation was begun, in order that
effect may be given to the rights ultimately established therein." Bristow v. Thacks-
ton, supra.
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The rule had its origin in the civil law and was expressed in the legal maxim
"pendente lite, nihil innoveture." (*3) The word "conveyance" in the
Twelfth Ordinance would seem to indicate that the principle may have been
derived from the practice in real actions at common law. (*4) At least
it was followed in common law actions before it was recognized in chan-
cery. (*5)
Since the formulation of this Ordinance, the doctrine has been general-
ly followed by the English (*6) and American courts (*7) in both legal
and equitable actions affecting land. In referring to it, Chancellor Kent
said that "it would be inpossible, as I apprehend it, to mention any rule of
law which has been established upon higher authority or with more uniform
sanction." (*8)
In harmony with these decisions, the Missouri courts have uniformly
held that a pendente lite purchaser of land, some interest or right in which
is sought to be affected by an action at law, acquires title subject to the final
decree rendered in the case. (*9) He who "steps into the shoes of the
litigant vendor is just as fully bound and concluded by the judgment so far
as the property is concerned, as the vendor himself." (*10) The fact the
vendee had no actual notice of the suit is immaterial. The pendency of the
(3) Jones v. Williams, 155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426.
(4) Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 57 N. Y. 616, 629.
(5) O'Reilly v. Nicholson, supra, McIlwrath v. Hollander, supra, Murray v. Bal-
lou, supra.
(6) Culpepper v. Austin, 2 Ch. cases, 115 Baens v. Canning, 1 Ch. cases, 301,
Preston v. Tubbin, 1 Vern. 286, Garth v. Ward, 2 Atk. 174, Sorrell v. Carpenter, 2 P.
Wins. 582, Bishop of Winchester v. Paine, 11 Ves. 194. The Master of Rolls, Sir
William Grant, in the Paine case, thus states the reason for the rule: "He who pur-
chases during the pendency of the suit is bound by the decree, the same as the person
from whom he derives title. The litigating parties are exempted from the necessity of
taking any notice of a title so acquired. As to them, it is as if no such title existed.
Otherwise, suits would be interminable, or what would be the same in effect, it would
be in the pleasure of one party at what period the suit should be determined. The
rule may sometimes operate with hardship, but general convenience requires it."
(7) Secomb, et al v. Steele, 61 U. S. 94, 15 L. Ed. 833, Norton v. Burge, 35 Conn.
250, Jackson v. Warren, 32 Ill. 331, Inloes Lessee v. Harvey, 11 Md. 519, Berinets Les-
see v. Williams, 5 Ohio 461, Story's Equity Jurisprudence (14th Ed.) Vol. 1, Sec. 536.
(8) Murray v. Ballou, supra.
(9) O'Reilly v. Nicholson, supra. (This was a partition suit.) Real Estate Sav-
ings Inst. v. Colonious, 63 Mo. 290, McIlwrath v. Hollander, supra, (These were suits
to set aside wills. The McIlwrath case was filed in 1867, and the deed to the pen-
dent lite puichaser was executed in 1874). Becker v. Stroeher, 167 Mo. 306, 66 S. W.
1083. (This was a partition suit.) Tice v. Hamilton, 188 Mo. 298, 87 S. W. 497,
(This was a suit to recover the value of improvement on land). Tice v. Edmonston,
210 Mo. 411, 109 S. W. 33, Mo. State Life Insurance Co. v. Russ (Mo. Sup.), 214 S. W.
860, (These were actions to determine title), Alexander v. Haffner, 323 Mo. 1197, 20
S. W. (2d) 896, (This was a suit to enforce the lien of a special tax bill).
(10) Mo. State Life Insurance Co. v. Russ, supra.
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case charges him with constructive knowledge. (*11) It is unnecessary that
notice of the suit be filed in the Recorder's office; if filed, it adds no efficaiy
to the constructive notice imparted by the pendency of the suit. (*12) To
illustrate, suppose the defendant, in a statutory quiet title suit, after a judg-
ment in his favor has been rendered by the trial court, conveys the land to
John Jones who has no actual knowledge of the suit. No lis pendens has
been filed in the Recorder's office. Later, the Supreme Court, on plain-
tiff's appeal, reverses the decree and orders judgment rendered in plaintiff's
favor. As against the plaintiff, John Jones has no title. (*13).
Not only is the immediate vendee of the litigant thus bound by the final
judgment, but subsequent grantees of such vendee likewise are concluded.
(*14) This doctrine obtains, even though the change of venue has been
granted and the judgment is rendered in a county other than that in which
the suit was filed. (*15) The vendee is bound by all parts of the judgment,
not just by that part which expressly determines some right in the land.
(*16).
(11) Mo. State Life Insurance Co. v. Russ, supra, Turner v. Edmonston, supra,
O'Reilly v. Nicholson, supra.
(12) McIlwrath v. Hollander, supra. The Court points out that the statute (now
Scc. 3155, R. S. Mo. 1929) applies only to claims of an equitable nature. The Court
indicates that so far as suits based on an equitable claim are concerned, the statute
abrogated the doctrine of lis pendens, and the vendee is not charged with notice of such
suit until notice is filed with the Reecorder of Deeds. In Mo. State Life Insurance
Co. v. Russ, supra, the Court, in discussing this statute, says, "This statute does not
crcate the law of lis pendens in this state, but merely imposes a limitation upon the
common law rule and is to be construed with reference to that rule and the reason
behind it * * *. The Statute, therefore, merely withdraws from the operation of the
common law rule of lis pendens proceedings and kinds of actions therein mentioned.
(13) This was the situation presented by the case of Mo. State Life Insurance
Co. v. Russ, supra.
(*14) Mo. State Life Insurance Co. v. Russ, supra.
(*15) Mcllwrath v. Hollander, supra, Mo. State Life -Insurance Co. v. Russ,
supra.
(*16) Tice v. Hamilton, supra. In this case, the plaintiff sued to recover the
value of improvements he had made on certain land. During the pendency of the case,
defendant executed a deed of trust conveying the land to Vance, trustee. Thereafter,
plaintiff recovered judgment for the value of the improvements and that he be permit-
ted to retain possession until the judgment was paid. The judgment also provided
fliat he recover his costs from defendant and that execution issue therefor. The land
was sold on execution under the judgment for costs and Hamilton acquired title through
the purchaser at the execution sale. The deed of trust was later foreclosed and the
property was purchased by Tice at the foreclosure sale. The Court held that Hamil-
ton had a superior title to that of Tice, as the judgment for costs was a part of the
judgment for the value of the improvements, and 'being a part of the judgment the
purchaser pendente lite is bound by it and takes subject to it just as much as any othv_,
part of the judgment or decree."
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From this brief statement of the theory and some of the applications of
the doctrine, it is apparent that actions at law involving land may affect
the title thereto, as much as a deed, and that the pendency of such actions,
regardless of whether notice thereof is filed in the Recorder's office, charges
subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers with constructive knowledge to
the same extent as does the record of a deed. Because of this, a purchaser
or mortgagee, before accepting his conveyance or lien, should be as careful
to ascertain whether there are any actions at law pending against his pred-
ecessors in title affecting the land, as he is to determine what deeds have
been recorded conveying the land.
The only practical way a person can ascertain this fact and so protect
himself is by having the abstracter search the records in the Circuit Clerk's
office and certify as to suits pending. It i's common practice for the ab-
stracter to certify as to judgments or mechanics' liens, but most forms of
abstracters' certificates do not recite any search as to suits pending against
parties in the chain of title.
The writer believes that an attorney, before approving the title for a
purchaser or mortgagee should require the abstracter to expressly certify as
to such matters. Theoretically, the certificate should cover pending suits
against all persons in the chain of title, but such a search, especially in large
cities, would add materially to the cost of the abstract. It is believed that
as a practical matter, a search for pending suits against persons who have
acquired a record interest in the land, within the last twenty years, would be
adequate protection. Very few suits remain undetermined for a longer
time. That period, however, is an arbitrary one, and in exceptional cases,
may be too short.
*Gardner Smith, LL.B. 17.
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Kansas City, Missouri.
